1 Introduction Holmstrom and Kaplan (2003) and Holmstrom (2005) point out that the enormous increase in equity-based payment and shareholder activism are two notable changes in U.S. corporate governance over the past 20 years. Linck, Netter and Yang (2006a) show that the structure of boards has changed, too. This trend is in response to both internal and external environment which include globalization, shareholder activisim, and corporate scandals. The size of boards declined from the early 1990s to the late 1990s but this trend shows a break after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act passed. The proportion of outside directors on boards increased over the last 15 years.
The goal of this paper is to study what has happened over time to the selection of retired CEOs as board members. For that purpose, I revisit Brickley, Linck and Coles (1999) CEOs who hold at least one board directorship (inside or outside) 2 years after retirement in the full sample increased from 75.1% in 1989-1993 to 94.4% in 1998-2002 . The cause is the increase in the number of outside directorships to be …lled. The average number of directorships retired CEOs hold has also increased signi…cantly from 1.8 to 2.53, which implies that the total number of retired CEOs on boards has risen 23 .
The second …nding is that pre-retirement accounting performance explains the num- 1 The main contributions of Brickley, Linck and Coles (1999) are that (1) they provide evidence on a previously unidenti…ed source of manageral incentives (2) they suggest that …rms consider ability in choosing board members. The quality of CEO has positive e¤ects on the probability of serving directorships after retirement. They also explore other factors (…rm size, regulation and so on) to have e¤ects on the selection of board members.
2 It is hard to discuss the change in the proportion of retired CEOs on boards. Lehn, Patro and Zhao (2004) show evidence that mean board size has declined in 1990s. Mulherin (2005) also shows that the average number of directors has a downward trend. Linck, Netter and Yang (2006a) , however, provide di¤erent evidence for the size of board. They show that there is a general decline in board size from the early 1990s to the late 1990s, but it begins to rise at 2002, especially in large …rms. Their data con…rms that the average size of board during 2000-2004 is smaller than that during 1991-1995 in large …rms, which is exactly overlapped with my time frame. However, if we also take into account middle-and small-sized …rms, we cannot conclude that the currnet board size is smaller than that during 1989-1993. 3 In a slightly di¤erent angle, Ferris, Jagannathan and Pritchard (2003) provide evidence that the mean number of directorships held by outside directors (current CEO, retired CEO, lawyer, professor and so on) is 1.89 based on 1995 board data sets. The average number of directorships (inside or outside) retired CEOs who have at least one outside directorship hold is 3.03 during 1998-2002, compared to 2.8 during 1989-1993 . We can conjecture that retired CEOs tend to have more directorships than mean level of directorships held by outside directors.
ber of outside directorships CEOs hold two years after retirement in the 1989-1993 sample well. In contrast, it has no explanatory power in the 1998-2002 sample. A 5.6% increase in accounting performance produces a 7% increase in the probability of holding at least one outside directorship after retirement in the 1989-1993 sample. It is, however, not signi…cantly correlated with the number of outside directorships in the 1998-2002 sample.
Third, the stock price performance (abnormal stock return) of his company while he was a CEO a¤ects whether an ex-CEO becomes a chairman or insider director on his own board after he retires, especially in the 1998-2002 sample. If the stock price performance increases by 25%, the probability that CEO will serve as a chairman or inside director during 1998-2002 goes up by 51%, compared to 11. 4% during 1989-1993 . This …nding is consistent with Holmstrom and Kaplan (2003) . They point out that "CEO pay to market-performance sensitivity" has risen more than tenfold from 1980-1999 due to the increase in equity-based compensation. Since the retention of CEOs on their own boards is an implict incentive to mitigate horizon problems, this trend (the increase in "pay to market performance" sensitivity) could show up here.
Finally, both samples share the common feature that if retired CEOs'original …rms are regulated (utility, depository institution and insurance), the probability of their serving as outside directors decreases, though this negative e¤ect has been declining over outside directorships during 1998 -2002 , compared to 0.73 during 1989 -1993 . Brickley, Linck and Coles (1999 argue that the reason why retirees from regulated sectors tend to have less outside directorships is that regulated sectors are less visible or the retirees accumulate human capital which is less related to competitive markets. Following this logic, the deregulation of regulated sectors might explain the increasing directorships for CEOs from regulated industries 4 . Many studies compare the governance structure before and after the deregulation process. Crawford, Ezzell and Miles (1995) show a signi…c-ant increase in pay-performance sensitivities from a sample of the regulated period to a sample of the deregulated period in U.S. bank industries. Palia (2000) studies the intial entry of CEOs into the market and …nds that lowerly educated CEOs are slotted into utility (regulated) sectors, while airlines have highly quali…ed CEOs after deregulations. Cunat and Guadalupe (2003) …nd that the total pay of executives increases according to a degree of product market competiton by exploring the deregulation stories in bank and …nancial sectors. De…nitely, we can hypothesize that we continue to experience the e¤ect of deregulation because currently, the market would be more likely to recognize retired CEOs from regulated industries as more talented candidates for board members than CEOs who worked in regulated industries before deregulations.
As for the …rst …nding, there are four potential explanations why retired CEOs became more common on boards. First, the total size of outside directors might have been increased. Second, …rms begin to strongly prefer retired CEOs as independent board members because retired CEOs have enough skills and experience to advise executives. Holmstrom (2005) describes the reason why current CEOs and retired CEOs serve other …rms'board. They are more knowledged to understand the …rm's strategy and information. In this sense, more uncertain managerial environments due to the globalization and mergers could increase the demand for retired CEOs as directors to invite better advice for the management. The organizational complexity of …rms due to globalization (diversi…cation) and mergers over the past twenty years could make retired CEOs more attractive as board members because they may have greater knowledge about the management, organization of …rms, or about the global managerial environment, making them optimal choices for better monitoring. Third, shareholder activism mainly critcizes multiple directorships of directors with full time jobs (current CEO, lawyer, professor and so on), making it hard to hire quali…ed directors with full time jobs, which implies that retired CEOs without full time jobs become more popular in the market for outside directors. Finally, since the amount of work assigned to board members might have been increased, other candidates for outside directors with full time jobs have less In …nancial sectors, the 1994 Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching E¢ ciency Act allows all commercial banks to operate branches across states, and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA, 1999) eliminates barriers among banking, insurance, and securities underwriting.
time to devote as a board member. It could be the case that Institutional Investors actively communicate with executives and board members to put a great deal of pressure on boards. Alternatively, increased work burden could come from corporate scandals. Holmstrom and Kaplan (2003) suggest that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act increases the responsibility of managers and board members. Subsequently, it increases the workload and risk of boards. Linck, Netter and Yang (2006b) …nd evidence that after the SarbanesOxley Act, …rms pay more directors fees, which is consistent with the theory that the The distribution of Brickley, Linck and Coles (1999) 's data set 5 (the 1989-1993 sample) is in parenthesis. 6 My data set (hereafter, "the current data set" or "the [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] sample") contains many more service industries (SIC code 73 ) and many fewer utilities (SIC code 49 ), depository institutions (SIC code 60 ) than Brickley, Linck and Coles (1999) 's data (the 1989-1993 sample).
Performance and other data
I collect the accounting information from the S&P Compustat and stock returns from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). I de…ne pre-retirement performance as the CEO's total tenure or his last four years in o¢ ce, whichever is less. Brickley, Linck and Coles (1999) acquire accounting and stock information by similar methods.
The primary reason to stress the most recent four-year performance period is to compare my outcome to that of Brickley, Linck and Coles (1999) . I use return on asset (ROA), industry-adjusted ROA, and abnormal stock returns as measures of performance.
Industry-adjusted ROA is the average annual return on assets, net of the median return 7 on assets for all …rms in the industry including sample …rms 8 . The abnormal stock return is the compound average annual stock return minus the CRSP value-weighted index. The descriptive statistics by tenure as a CEO are reported in Table 3 . While 82
CEOs (29.6% in the full sample) have tenure of less than 5 years during 1989-1993, only 5 James Linck provides Brickley, Linck and Coles (1999)'s full dataset, so that I can show descriptive statistics and estimates not present in Brickley, Linck and Coles (1999) using their original data set. 6 Brickley, Linck and Coles (1999) Table 4-A) . Also, the percentage of CEOs who serve at least one outside directorship in the full sample has increased from 58.1%
to 78% (See Outside + 2 years > 0 in Table 4 -A).
As Table 4 -B shows, the average number of directorships retired CEOs hold has increased signi…cantly (Total + 2 years, from 1.8 to 2.52 directorships), which is mostly driven by the increase in the number of outside directorships (Outside + 2 years, from 1.3 to 2.08 ).
3 The selection of outside directors Brickley, Linck and Coles (1999) show that the accounting performance (ROA and industry-adjusted ROA) has an economically signi…cant e¤ect on the number of out-9 One might conjecture that the takeover boom of the 1980s could explain the shorter tenure of retired CEOs during 1989 -1993 . Holmstrom and Kaplan (2001 , however, show that the takeover activity in the late 1990s is very high.
1 0 Hudson and Starks (2001) present evidence on CEO turnover decisions from 1971 to 1994 and show that the incidence of forced turnover is the highest durning 1989-1994. However, there is no data as to whether this increased turnover continued or not. In addition, the distribution of retired CEOs' age is very similar between the two time frames, so it is hard to say that the shorter tenure during 1989-1993 could be due to frequent forced turnovers.
1 1 This …nding is not consistent with the prediction of Hermalin (2005) . He predicts that CEOs'tenure would be shorter due to the current trend in corporate governance, a greater board diligence.
side board seats in 1989-1993. 12 My result contradicts this …nding for 1998-2002. Table   5 provides the estimate of ordered logit models. The dependent variable takes on the value 0,1,2,3,4 which means the number of outside directorships CEOs hold two years after retirement. If an executive has more than 4 directorships, the value 4 is assigned.
The explanatory variables are the performance over the four years before retirement, the natural logarithm of total assets, and a regulation dummy which equals one if the …rm is a utility, depository institution or insurance company 13 . The outcome of the [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] sample is in parenthesis. In this setup, there is no di¤erence between Brickley, Linck and Coles (1999) and my regression except for the time period. The estimated coe¢ cients on Return on asset 14 and Industry adjusted ROA are insigni…cant and on Abnormal stock return is signi…cantly negative in the 1998-2002 sample. This implies that accounting performance 15 does not have an e¤ect on the number of outside board seats, and stock price performance (abnormal stock return) has a negative e¤ect. Firm size (LnAsset) and the regulation dummy (Regulated dummy) have similar e¤ects in both samples. The number of outside directorships is highly correlated with the size of the …rm at which the CEO had worked before retirement. The number of outside directorships decreases when the CEO's original …rm is regulated. Brickley, Linck and Coles (1999) conjecture that regulated …rms are less visible than unregulated …rms, or that the CEO in the typical regulated company has human capital less related to competitive markets. 1 2 Brickley, Linck and Coles (1999)'s potential explanation for the strong relationship between the accounting returns and the number of outside directorships is for the following: "there are at least two reasons why a superior CEO's ability might be re ‡ected in superior accounting returns. First, if the CEO's skills are speci…c to the …rm, the …rm might share in the di¤erence between CEO's value to the …rm and his second highest-valued use. Second, accounting numbers do not re ‡ect all a …rm's compensation cost....Therefore, if …rms want CEOs with known high ability as outside directors, the likelihood of being asked to serve on another …rm's board is more likely to be correlated with ROA over the …nal four years than with abnormal stock returns." (Brickley, Linck and Coles (1999) , page 371) 1 3 As I mentioned before, while I obtain SIC codes in 1998-2002 samples from Compustat, Brickley, Linck and Coles (1999 ) use in 1989 -1993 samples from CRSP. To make the category of regulated sectors be consistent between two data sets I classify utility, depository institution, and insurance …rms on both samples as regulated …rms and this classi…cation is based on SIC code of Compustat. SIC codes are 49 (utility), 60 (depository institution), and 63 (insurance). Brickley, Linck and Coles (1999) classify utility (SIC code 49 on CRSP), bank (SIC code 6023, 6025 on CRSP), and insurance (SIC code 63 on CRSP) as regulated sectors in their paper. 1 4 Table 6 presents that the estimated coe¢ cient on Return on asset in the 1989-1993 sample is signi…c-antly positive. I run the regression excluding the retired CEOs who hold 4 or more outside directorships in the 1989-1993 sample. It shows that the coe¢ cient on Return on asset is not signi…cant, which implies that the e¤ect of pre-retirement accounting performance is mostly driven by retired CEOs who hold 4 or more outside directorships. The number of retired CEOs who hold 4 or more is 27 out of 277 retired CEOs in the 1989-1993 sample.
1 5 I also utilize Return on Equity (ROE) as an explanatory variable. ROE does not have any explanatory power for the number of outside directorships, either.
Next, I compare the size of the e¤ect. A 5.6% increase in return on assets (the standard deviation), taking all other variables at their means, produces a 7% increase in the probability of holding at least one outside directorship after retirement in the 1989-1993 sample. There, however, does not exist a signi…cant correlation between the two variables in the 1998-2002 sample. If the log of assets increases by 1.28 (its standard deviation), the probability that a CEO will serve one or more outside directorships during 1989-1993 increases by 18.82%, compared to 11.6% during 1989-1993. However, if the log of assets goes up by the same amount, the probability that a CEO will serve three or more outside directorships during 1989-1993 rises by 10.75%, compared to 17.28% during 1998-2002. Finally, consider the regulation dummy. Working in regulated industries decreases their probability of serving at least one outside directorship by 34% in the [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] sample, compared to 34% in the 1998-2002 sample.
The deregulation e¤ect
I start by reconsidering regulated sector-speci…c e¤ects. Table 6 Table 7 -A) 18 . Retired CEOs from regulated 1 6 The mean di¤erence in ROA between regulated sectors and non-regulated sectors is mostly driven by the di¤erence between depository institution and complements. The reason why depository institutions have lower ROA is that loans of bank are classi…ed as an asset, so that depository institutions tend to have the larger …rm size (total value of assets) than non-depository institutions.
1 7 There does not exist a signi…cant mean di¤erence in the total number of outside directorships between depository institution (insurance) and non-depository institution (non insurance) in the 1998-2002 sample. During 1989-1993, CEOs who retired from depository institution and insurance industry have signi…cantly lower outside directorships than those of complements, which is not consistent with the 1998-2002 sample 1 8 As I mentioned before, the average number of outside directorships retired CEOs hold has increased signi…cantly over time. This signi…cant increase is mainly driven by regulated sectors. 
Chairman/inside director
In this section, I explore factors which a¤ect the probability of retired CEOs serving on their own boards 2 years after leaving o¢ ce. Table 9 presents the mean pre-retirement performance and …rm size at which CEO worked before retirement by whether a CEO has a chairman/inside directorship or not. The pre-retirement performance measured by abnormal stock return is signi…cantly better for CEOs who hold a chairman/inside directorship during both time periods. The Wilcoxon rank-sum test, however, suggests that pre-retirement return on asset averaged over CEOs who have a chairman or insider directorship is signi…cantly higher than pre-retirement return on asset of complement 1 9 The negative coe¢ cient of the regulation dummy in Table 6 is mainly originated from depository institutions and insurance sectors during both time periods. The …nancial industry dummy on speci…c-ation (1) mainly captures the e¤ect of depository institution and insurance. Speci…cation (2) in Table 9 seperately shows the e¤ect of both industries.
only during 1989-1993. Table 10 shows the main outcome of the logit estimation. Abnormal stock return explains the probability of a CEO's serving as chairman or insider director on his own board very well, which is similar to Brickley, Linck and Coles (1999) . 20 However, the size of the e¤ect is much larger during 1998-2002. The length of the tenure as a CEO has a signi…cantly positive e¤ect during both time periods. Brickley, Linck and Coles (1999) argue that this outcome is consistent with the theory that the longer tenure is related with better performance and more CEO power. The di¤erence in the size of the e¤ect between two samples is interesting. If the stock price performance rises by 25% (its standard deviation), taking all other variables at their means, the probability that a CEO will serve as a chairman or inside director during 1989-1993 increases by 11.4%, compared to only 51% during 1998-2002. This …nding is consistent with Holmstrom and Kaplan (2003) . They point out that "CEO pay to market-performance sensitivity" has increased by more than ten fold from 1980-1999 due to the increase in equity-based compensations. Since the retention of a CEO on his own board is an implicit incentive, this trend could show up here.
The Cross E¤ect
Brickley, Linck and Coles (1999) already pointed out that there may be a "cross e¤ect".
A retired CEO who serves as outside director on other boards would be less likely to work as a chairman or inside director on his own board. To test the cross e¤ect, let us revisit the estimation in Table 10 . My …rst approach is to simply add the outside dummy to the list of explanatory variables. If a retired CEO holds at least one outside directorship 2 years after retirement, the outside dummy takes value 1. The coe¢ cient on the outside dummy is signi…cantly negative in the 1998-2002 sample (See the coe¢ cient of outside in Table 11 ). 21 The probability of serving as a chairman or inside director on one's own board increases by 21% given a discrete change in the outside directorship dummy in the 1989-1993 sample, compared to a 33% decrease in the 1998-2002 sample 22 .
There may be, however, an endogeneity problem in this speci…cation. Whether a retired CEO takes a chairman position on his own board or not may a¤ect the number of outside directorships held by him. For that reason, I use two-stage least square estimation to check the cross-e¤ect. The instrument for the outside dummy is the regulation dummy.
The results are reported in Table 12 . The pre-retirement performance and …rm-size (LnAsset) are assumed to have e¤ects on both the probability of serving as outside directors and as a chairman after retirement. The outside directorship dummy has a signi…cantly negative e¤ect on the probability of serving as a chairman or inside director 2 years after retirement in the 1998-2002 sample. For instance, a 14% increase in the predicted probability of holding at least one outside director produces a 15.2% decrease in the probability of a retired CEO's serving as a chairman or inside director on his own boards 2 years after retirement.
6 Discussion for accounting performance I …nd that the likelihood of serving as an outside director on the boards 2 years after retirement is not related to a CEO's performance over his last four years in o¢ ce in the 1998-2002 sample, which is not consistent with the 1989-1993 sample. I used Return on asset (ROA) and industry adjusted ROA for performance variables, just as Brickley, Linck and Coles (1999) did. I have two suspects which could explain this puzzle. First, the career opportunities for the talented CEOs after retirement might have risen over time. In this case, we need to take into account other job positions after retirement to precisely measure the e¤ect of pre-retirement performances 23 . Second, …rms increasingly put a more weight on the general skills rather than …rm-speci…c skills when they select e¤ect on the outside directorships or not. Similarly, I add the chairman/insider dummy to the estimations in Table 5 . The negative relationship exists only in the 1998-2002 sample. However, the two-stage least square estimation in Table 12 shows that serving as a chairman/inside director does not have an e¤ect on the probability of holding outside directorships in the 1998-2002 sample.
2 2 This is based on speci…cation (2) in Table 11 . 2 3 We can easily observe that many CEOs have several job positions after retirement except outside directorships (community board, goverment organization, o¢ cer in private …rms, consultant and so on). Also, Ferris, Jagannathan and Pritchard (2003) show that 56% of outside directors declined an o¤er to serve on boards, with a lack of time as their reason for refusal. However, there is no clue that a time trend in the career opportunities exists. board members. One of Brickley, Linck and Coles (1999) 's potential explanations for the strong relationship between the accounting returns and the number of outside directorship is that the accounting performance might re ‡ect talented CEO's ability under the condition that the CEO's skills are speci…c to the …rm because the …rm could share the di¤erence between CEO's value to the …rm and his next highest-value. In this sense, if the …rm increasingly requires the general skills to outside board members, the accounting performances might be less important in the selection of outside directors. Brickley, Linck and Coles (1999) 's data set (1989-1993 5.25(2.1) 5.39(3.78**) 5.11(3.1) 5.63(3.59) 5.09(3.18) 7.42**(4.1) 22.42(37.37) 13(28) 20.63(31.82) 1 50(58) 20(20.94) 32(45) 19.39(22.73) 9(18) 14.29(20.45) 2 50(48) 20(17.33) 29(36) 17.58(18.18) 13(15) 20.63(17.05) 3 42(28) 16.8(10.11) 28(19) 16.97(9.6) 10(11) 15.87(12.5) 4 or more 53(27) 21.2(9.75) 39(24) 23.64(12.12) 18(16) 28.57(18.18) Total +2 year>0 236(208) 94.4(75.1) 156(162) 94.55(81.8) 58(77) 92.06(87.5) Total +2 year 0 14(69) 5.6(24.9) 9(36) 5.45(18.2) 5(11) 7.94(12.5) 1 64(76) 25.6(27.4) 40(56) 24.24(28.3) 9(21) 14.29(23.86) 2 57(48) 22.8(17.3) 38(39) 23.03(19.7) 14(19) 22.22(21.59) 3 52(41) 20.8(14.8) 32(32) 19.39(16.2) 14(12) 22.22(13.64) 4 or more 63(43) 25.2(15.5) 46(35) 27.89(17.7) 21(25) 33.34(28.41) Total 250(277) 165(198) 63(88) (60,61,62,63) p-value Year 1989 (60,61,62,63) p-value Year -1993 (60,61,62,63) p-value Year 1998 (60,61,62,63) p-value Year -2002 
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